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Abstract 
A framework for sensor networks with multiple owners develops a mechanism for 
assured and controlled access to sensor assets owned and maintained by disparate 
organizations. The framework addresses the limitations in an existing system and 
proposes extensions to it. It also provides new mechanisms for cross-domain 
authentication and authorization by implementing a prototype as a proof of concept.  
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1  Introduction 
 
Latest developments in wireless communications attracted increased research upon 
sensor networks. The low-cost, low-power sensor devices often have limited 
computation and communication capabilities beyond the basic environment sensing.  
These capabilities coupled with growth in electronics opened up many technical 
issues in building networked systems based on them. This led to the design and 
architecture of systems like [1], [2], [3] and [4]. The objectives of [4], the SensorNet 
initiative were to: develop and/or discover the technology, standards, and technical 
requirements for an integrated national warning and alert system, to provide an 
incident discovery, awareness and response capability addressing local, regional, and 
national needs.  SensorNet provides a standard mechanism to move information from 
sensors though the Internet to end user applications. Coordination of SensorNet 
activities has been lead by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).  
Many efforts in the past addressed the design issues of various component 
technologies of sensor networks. PicoRadio [5], SmartDust [6] focused on system 
level issues in designing sensor hardware.  LEACH [7] focused on network layer 
design issues for these networks. Other works like SensoNet [8] and WINS [9] 
recommend an entire protocol stack for sensor systems. Relatively few systems like 
SINA [8] discussed a model for sophisticated information dissemination systems that 
could be based upon the underlying sensor net technologies. At the SensorNet 
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Architecture Forum [10], a unified architecture to enable the use of resources owned 
by disparate organizations to support the objective of SensorNet was discussed.  
As sensor networks progress towards widespread deployment the security issues 
involved assume importance.  Many early protocols like SNEP, µTesla [11] and Tesla 
[12] were proposed as building blocks to provide standard security functions to these 
networks. While work like [13] focuses on security solutions used for mobile user 
devices in the context of sensor networks, efforts like [14] considers a variety of   
approaches for key distribution in sensor networks by analyzing the overhead of these 
protocols on a variety of hardware platforms. Various research efforts were directed 
on providing a in low-end devices by integrating cryptographic primitives with low 
cost microcontrollers. For example: AVR controllers [15] and the Dallas iButton [16] 
support primitives for public key encryption, together with a possibility for modular 
exponentiation.  
The above studies focused mainly upon the security functions that can be built 
inside a sensor node. They do not consider a broader security infrastructure for other 
components of sensor network architecture as the sensors are limited in resources to 
handle memory and computation intensive methods like asymmetric cryptography. 
Also they do not consider issues arising out of disparate ownership and cross policy 
domain resource access.   
The research aim of this thesis is to develop one such framework that 
incorporates sophisticated authorization/authentication mechanisms that are secure 
and suited for disseminating and analyzing sensor information by extending a related 
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system. The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview 
of the components and functionalities of the multi-owner architecture. Chapter 3 
gives a background of an existing system Ambient Computing Environment (ACE) 
[17], followed by Chapter 4 that discusses the extension of the existing system 
architecture to meet the new set of security and management requirements for a 
scalable and rapidly deployable sensor network. Chapter 5 presents a trust 
management with single and multiple organizations. Chapter 6 describes a prototype 
implementation of the proposed access control framework. Chapter 7 describes the 
conclusions and future extensions. 
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2  Multi-Owner Architecture 
2.1 Overview 
The objective here is to develop a unified architecture that has elements 
owned/controlled by a variety of organizations which can communicate across cross-
administrative domains. The features of the architecture include:  
• Assured and controlled access to sensor nodes in a multi-owner 
environment. 
• Archiving and information dissemination.  
• Application supporting high bandwidth requirements. 
• Rapidly deployable sensor network. 
This chapter gives an overview of the components and functionalities of the 
architecture. 
2.2 Components and Functionalities 
The architectural components are divided into three layers as shown in the 
figure 2.1 based on their functionality: 
•   Device Layer 
•   Repository Layer 
•   Application Layer 
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Figure 2.1: Multi-Owner architecture diagram representing the various components 
and their communications. 
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2.2.1 Device Layer 
 
Device Layer composes of all the physical sensor endpoints together with the 
first level of data access and management points for the entire architecture. This 
consists of  
• Sensors 
• Sensor nodes 
• Sensor services 
• Collectors 
 
Sensors are hardware devices capable of transducing a physical property e.g., 
temperature, pressure, light, humidity, etc., into an electric signal. Sensors 
communicate the collected data with the sensor node that controls them in the sensor 
network. The sensors could be of different types such as radiological, mechanical, 
optical or chemical sensors. Often sensors are characterized by small size and low 
energy consumption. 
A sensor node is a computer that typically manages one or more sensors through a 
set of services. The sensors could be directly connected to the node either through 
serial or parallel ports or through a multi-hop network. The communication between 
the sensors and the node may or may not incorporate a secure communication. The 
security of this link depends upon the nature of the connectivity.  
Sensor services are programs that control the sensors attached to the node. There 
could be one or more services per node, which each service dealing with one sensor. 
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In the multi-owner architecture, there is a one-one mapping between the sensor 
service and the sensor controlled by it. In practical application, a single service could 
control more than one sensor. The architecture could be extended so that one service 
supports multiple sensors.  
Collectors are programs that collect data from these services and transport them to 
the repository layer for further processing. There could be one or more collectors 
depending on the size of the device layer. The communication between the collectors 
and the sensor services follow the access control mechanism discussed later in this 
document. Collectors should authenticate and authorize themselves with the service, 
before tasking or configuring a sensor. Collectors collect data in one direction (from 
device to repository), other services load data or commands from repository to device, 
e.g., the Sensor Databases to the sensors to command the sensors. For example: 
loading a new smell profile in the Cyranose 320 Electronic Nose sensor (referred as 
Cyranose henceforth) from a Sensor database. Hence, Collectors could be viewed as 
intermediaries between the Device and the Repository layer. Collectors talk to the 
devices which typically belong to their organization or domain, our solution is not 
restricted for such a communication but spans across different organizational 
domains. Figure 2.1 shows sensors, sensor nodes and collectors from two 
organizations A and B. 
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2.2.2   Repository Layer 
This layer stores the collected sensor data from the device layer. This 
composes essentially of databases which could be either: 
• Sensor Databases that store and retrieve sensor data.  
Examples:  
o Database of the smell profiles, the response to a particular sample 
produced by the Cyranose. 
o Database of images captured by cameras used for surveillance. 
• Infrastructural databases that store other information required to support the 
system. Examples:  
o Service Directory – database of current services available such as 
Temperature Sensor Service, Nose Service etc... 
o Regional Database – database of location of sensors. 
There could be multiple repositories in this layer, each owned by a different 
organization. Figure 2.1 shows the repositories owned by two organizations A and B, 
where Organization A has a database of smell profiles along with the infrastructural 
databases and Organization B has a database of temperature data along with the 
infrastructural databases. The services from the device layer, register themselves with 
the Service Directory when they come online necessitating each organization to 
maintain a list of currently available services.  
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2.2.3   Application Layer 
The application layer provides a unified view of the various components of the 
architecture. This layer consists of: 
• Organizer, 
• Applications, 
• Service Objects, 
• Users, 
• Certificate Authorities, 
• Broker and 
• TTP 
Organizer is a program that collects and transports data from the repository layer to 
application layer. A user in the multi-owner architecture is a human being who uses 
the infrastructure for various applications. Applications are programs that can be 
either used to talk to the Organizer to get the processed data or to the Sensor Service 
directly as shown in the figure 2.1. All applications are written in Java and use 
Remote Method Invocation (RMI) [18] to communication with the sensor services. 
With JAVA-RMI, the services present themselves as remote objects. The applications 
get handles to these remote objects and use them to talk to the services. 
A Certificate Authority (CA) is an entity that issues digital certificates. Each 
organization will have its own CA to issue certificates for users within that 
organization. The role of the CA is to issue certificates to identify the users and 
credentials to identify the actions that can be performed by the users. If a user wants 
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to talk to devices from multiple organizations, then he/she needs to contact the CAs 
of different organizations individually to get credentials. As discussed later, we 
propose using a broker to avoid this requirement. A Broker is an entity that can issue 
credentials on behalf of CAs of different organizations. The broker is a delegated CA 
for the CAs of different organizations. A Trusted Third Party (TTP) is an entity 
who issues public key certificates for the CAs of organizations that trust it. The TTP 
help establish a chain of trust to authenticate users across multiple organizations. 
Chapter 5 describes the identification of users, credential distribution and delegation 
of trust when more than one organization is involved.  
This 3-tier architecture is layered with organized communication between the layers 
using the intermediaries such as Collectors and Organizers. However, we anticipate 
that some scenarios might require a user talking directly to a device without having to 
pass through this layered architecture.  
Direct Communication: Consider a situation where the user takes control over the 
sensors of all organizations and may wish to control them without having to talk to 
the organizer or the collector. In such a case, the user will get a single certificate to 
talk to devices from all organizations. The user will use the applications to talk to the 
sensor services controlling the devices through an out-of-band communication. Our 
solution also provides a way to have this Direct Communication between the user 
and the devices as in figure 2.1.  
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2.3 Challenges 
In the multi-owner architecture, there are many organizations with each 
organization owning a large number of devices and supporting a large number of 
actions. Some of the challenges that need to be addressed in such a scenario are: 
• How to provide control on the set of devices a client may use, even though 
the number of devices may be large? 
• How to provide control over the set of actions a client can perform on 
devices he can access, even though the number and/or types of devices are 
large? 
• How to provide clients access to devices controlled by multiple 
organizations? 
2.4 Proposed Solution 
In order to address the questions posted in the above section, we expand the 
Access Control framework provided by ACE [17], a system previously implemented 
at ITTC. ACE provides architecture for access control, but poses certain constraints 
for use in multi-owner environment as discussed in Section 4.1. We extend the access 
control mechanism used in ACE to achieve the granularity required for sensor 
networks with multiple owners. 
This chapter provided an overview of the multi-owner architecture, the challenges 
and the proposed solution of extending an existing architecture ACE. The next 
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section gives a background on ACE and highlights the features of ACE that are used 
for multi-owner architecture. 
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3  Background - ACE 
Access to resources is usually achieved by programs running on specific 
processors. The ACE architecture was developed to untie the binding between 
programs and computers, and to create independent services so that the users can 
roam anywhere still preserving their sessions with the resources.  ACE builds a 
pervasive system, where the users have long-lived workspaces and mobility within 
the environments irrespective of rooms or machines.  
 
3.1 ACE Architecture 
             
 Figure 3.1: ACE Architecture showing the various components. 
 
The services in the ACE architecture constitute the atomic level of computation. 
Services are grouped in to federations.  
The communication between the service and the client are accomplished in two ways: 
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• Control channel: Provides a way for communicating control messages. It 
is a reliable in-order channel. 
• Media channel: Provides a way for communicating audio and video. 
Reliability and in-order delivery are not important in this channel. 
ACE allows the client to access resources through four core services as shown in the 
figure 3.1: 
1. Service Directory: It is a directory service that locates all available 
services as well as their characteristics (Name, Location, and Service 
Class). All services register and un-register with this service. Since this is 
the directory for all the other services, the location of this service is fixed. 
2. User Database: It is a database of all users in the system. The information 
includes Public Key, Name, Login name and Login characteristics.  In 
ACE, the login characteristics include information like passwords, finger 
prints and iButton ids that can identify the user. 
3. Room Database: It is a database of the information of all the rooms and 
building in the system. 
4. Authentication Database: It contains the certificates of all the users in the 
system.  
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3.2 Key Features of ACE for the Multi-Owner Architecture 
3.2.1   Client Server Communication using Enhanced RMI 
Whenever a client wants to talk to the service, the client provides his 
credential showing that he has permissions to talk to the service to access the 
resources. The service validates his credential before providing the resource. The 
authorization is not only up to the point of providing the resource, but also extends to 
every method that the client requests to perform on the device. In order to provide this 
per-method authorization, an enhanced form of RMI is used. The result of the 
enhanced RMI system is two classes: 
• SecureUnicastServer.java: This handles new connections and creates a new 
client thread for each connection. 
• ServerClientThread.java: This authenticates the user. When the user requests 
to perform an action, this thread does the per-method authorization, and then 
executes the requested method and returns the result. 
The services present themselves as a Java remote object. The functionalities that the 
services advertise are given in the Java Interface. The client obtains the remote object 
to the service and performs actions using the Java RMI. This feature can be directly 
applied to multi-owner architecture, with the collectors being the clients, sensors 
being the devices and the sensor service being the gateway between the collectors and 
the sensors. 
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3.2.2   Secure Communication using TLS 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [19] provides authentication of the user and 
security of the message exchanges in the control channel. The users are identified by 
public key of the asymmetric key (either RSA [20] or DSA [21]). The keys are 
formatted to X.509 format [22], to be used by TLS. The public key is certified by a 
CA to verify the validity of the key. The user presents this signed certificate to any 
service for authentication. At the end of the handshake between the client and the 
server, a session key is negotiated and all the messages are encrypted with this key 
using any symmetric key algorithm such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
[23] or Data Encryption Standard (DES) [24]. 
In sensor networks with multiple owners, security of all the message exchanges 
between the elements of the architecture is important. This TLS and AES encryption 
of the ACE framework provides authentication of client-server, secured 
communication by encrypting the message exchanges and error-free delivery required 
in the communications between elements of the architecture. 
3.2.3 Access Control using KeyNote Trust Management System 
After user authentication, the exact permissions of the user determine the 
actions that the user can perform with the services. The service must authorize the 
actions requested by the user based on these permissions. ACE uses KeyNote Trust 
Management [25] to provide access control on the actions requested by the users. A 
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very brief overview of KeyNote concepts and terminology that will be used in the 
remaining of the document follows. 
3.2.3.1 KeyNote Terminology 
KeyNote provides a simple language for describing and implementing 
security policies, trust relationships and digitally-signed credentials to control 
potentially dangerous actions over untrusted networks. Some of the Keynote concepts 
and terminology include:    
• Assertions: Assertions describe the conditions under which a principal 
authorizes actions requested by other principal. 
• Policy: Policy is one or more unsigned assertions. 
• Credential: A credential is a signed assertion. A credential can be securely 
transmitted over untrusted networks. 
•  Action Attributes: Action Attributes are (name, value) pairs, and the 
primary objects on which KeyNote assertions operate.  These names and 
values are arbitrary-length strings.  KeyNote does not interpret the 
semantics of these names and values.  These semantics must be agreed 
upon by the writers of applications and the authors of credentials.  
 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Authorizer: "x509-base64:MIIEBzCC..” 
Licensees: "x509-base64:MIIECjC..” 
Comment: Authorizer delegates read access to the Licensees 
Conditions: ( app_domain ==”FileSystems” && file == “etc/passwd”) Æ “read”; 
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:XQZopw..” 
Figure 3.2: Example of a credential in KeyNote. 
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Figure 3.2 shows an example of a credential. “Authorizer” identifies the principal 
authorizing actions to users identified in “Licensees”, under the “Conditions” that in 
the application demanding authorization, the action attributes set includes: 
• The attribute named “app_domain” with value “FileSystems” and 
• The attribute named “file” with value "etc/passwd". 
The authorization level is “read”. KeyNote provides a Compliance Checker engine 
that evaluates credentials and returns the result (an application-defined string). The 
application can then decide what to do depending on the result given by the KeyNote 
engine. ACE uses KeyNote Trust Management to authorize the client actions with the 
device. In ACE, the administrator “ace” is given all rights to use the system. This 
“ace” administrator is provided a policy which is implicitly trusted and does not have 
to be signed. 
 
KeyNote-version: 2 
authorizer: POLICY 
local-constants: KEY1 = "x509-base64:MIIEZzCCA...LCSG0N2ICh" 
licensees: KEY1 
conditions: (APP_DOMAIN == "ACE") -> _MAX_TRUST; 
Figure 3.3: Example of a policy in ACE. 
 
Figure 3.3 shows an example of a policy.   
Figure 3.4 shows an example of a credential used in the ACE environment. 
KeyNote-version: 2 
authorizer: "x509-base64:MIIEZzCCA9CgAw...LCSG0N2ICh" 
licensees: KEY1 = "x509-base64:MIIEZnb53...ighfkRT4523k" 
conditions: ((APP_DOMAIN == "ACE") && 
(time >= 1082390980610) && (time <= 1082390980628)) -> "write"; 
signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:Nt4+XIP...soP+mgjjTXWA==" 
Figure 3.4: Example of a credential in ACE. 
  19
A CA is used to issue public key certificates and credentials. In ACE, the “ace” 
administrator acts as the CA. All other users get a credential with the “ace” 
administrator being the authorizer. 
This trust management allows the multi-owner architecture to control access to the 
actions performed by a collector on the sensors. Each method that the client is trying 
to access through the remote object of the service can be checked for authorization by 
querying the KeyNote engine. If the collector does not have a valid credential, he 
cannot perform the requested action on the sensor and an exception is raised. Since 
this authorization is implemented within the service infrastructure, all services 
inherently implement the authorization procedure. The examples of policy and 
credential show the expressiveness and ease of representation of security policies and 
credentials using a unified representation language.  
Although it is possible to conceive an equivalent system with popular key distribution 
and trust management systems like Kerberos, KeyNote offers significant advantages. 
The following section highlights and discusses these advantages in more detail. 
3.2.4   Choice of KeyNote Trust Management 
Kerberos was initially designed for symmetric key distribution and 
authentication. It included a delegation and authorization mechanisms which are not 
as sophisticated as KeyNote. The following section introduces Kerberos followed by 
a comparative discussion between Kerberos and KeyNote. 
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Introduction to Kerberos:  
Kerberos is a secret key based service for Authentication designed by MIT [26]. 
Kerberos achieves authentication of a user to access remote resources. The entities in 
Kerberos are:  
• The Key Distribution Center (KDC),   
• Principal or user and  
• An Application to authenticate users.   
The KDC shares a master key (symmetric cryptography) with each of the principal. 
Kerberos achieves “Decentralization” by dividing the network into realms. A realm is 
a collection of resources, users and a single KDC to manage. Each realm has its own 
KDC. Some of the deficiencies in Kerberos include: 
 
Cross-Domain Authentication:  
In the sensor network architecture with sensors owned by multiple 
organizations, cross-domain authentication is important. Cross-realm authentication 
in Kerberos is expensive in terms of administrative effort. All the users in each realm 
should know the trust relationships between realms in order to find a path of KDCs in 
between, to reach the intended destination. Referrals [27] can be used to interactively 
determine which KDCs to contact for tickets to establish a trust path to the 
destination. This comes with an assumption of using the domain name of the host for 
identifying the next KDC in the trust path. In KeyNote there is regular hierarchy of 
trust. Users from different domains can easily find a common CA up higher in the 
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hierarchy to establish a trust relationship. This feature will be essential to reduce 
administrative efforts in establishing trust paths in the multi-owner architecture. 
 
Delegation of Tasks: 
Delegation is another important aspect especially when there is a large 
network of sensors and cross-domain communications. In Kerberos, handling vertical 
separation of duties is difficult as there is no organized hierarchy of realms. If a user 
A has to delegate his task to user B, he needs to contact KDC to get a TGT (Ticket 
Granting Ticket - This includes {Identity, Session Key, Expiration time} signed by 
the KDC’s master key), give this TGT to B, which is used by B to contact the KDC 
again to issue tickets. For every delegation event, the KDC is contacted twice which 
is a disadvantage for performance reasons. The extra interaction with KDC allows it 
to know about a delegation event and enables the KDC to audit delegation events 
[28].  With KeyNote, delegation is simple with hierarchical arrangement of 
Certificate Authorities. Any user can delegate authority to anyone else in the network 
by issuing a certificate (also known as credential signed by this user) without having 
to contact any Certificate Authorities at all. The event of delegation is known only 
when the delegated user uses his certificate with an application to perform some 
action.  
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Authorization: 
Kerberos was initially designed for authentication only.  It authenticates the 
user, but the actions that the user performs on the resources are not validated. 
Kerberos was improved to support authorization by providing a field 
“AUTHORIZATION-DATA” in the TGT or tickets. For cross-domain delegation, 
this poses a difficulty in access-control as this authorization information should be 
included in each ticket issued by the intermediate KDCs and the destination has to 
contact each of the intermediate KDCs in the path for authorizing the user. This 
requires the KDCs to be online at all times, and also slows down the authorization 
procedure. KeyNote was designed mainly for authorization of actions performed by 
users. When the user requests an application to perform some action, the application 
submits the users request along with his certificate to the KeyNote Engine, which 
performs a compliance-checking and gives the result back to the application. The 
application can then decide whether to allow the user to continue or not. It helps the 
application in this decision-making procedure. For cross-domain authorization, in 
order to verify the certificate of the delegated user, KeyNote requires: 
• The public key of the CA who signed this certificate, 
• The certificate of this CA, 
• The public key and the certificate of the CA who issued certificate to the 
above CA. This is repeated until the root CA’s certificate is reached. 
Since all the public key certificates are available online, the authorization procedure 
is fast compared to Kerberos. Speeding up the authorization procedure is essential for 
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the multi-owner architecture, because the communication between a Collector and the 
Sensor Service is time critical. 
 
Synchronization of Clocks: 
Another disadvantage of Kerberos is that the nodes in the network should have 
their clocks reasonably synchronized (within five minutes) since the users 
authenticate each other by verifying the timestamp encrypted with the shared session 
key issued by the KDC. There is no need of clock synchronization in KeyNote. It is 
expected that the nodes in sensor networks will be loosely synchronized further 
motivating the use of KeyNote. 
In addition to the above advantages of KeyNote, it has a simple mechanism for 
message exchanges when implementing authorization. The following section 
describes the protocol of the message exchanges used in ACE.  
 
3.3 Access Protocol in ACE 
This section describes the sequence of actions when an ACE user talks to an ACE 
service.  Each time a new client contacts a service, the service spawns a new thread 
dedicated to the communication with the specific client. 
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Figure 3.5: Access Protocol showing the sequence of actions when an ACE Client 
contacts the ACE Service. 
 
 
Typically the following happens when a client wishes to access a resource: 
1. User contacts the service (the client thread of the service) for establishing a 
session. 
2. The service replies with its certificate for authentication, key exchange for 
establishing session key and request the user for his certificate. 
3. The user replies with his certificate and session key exchange. The user 
verifies the Server’s certificate. The client sends “Finished”. 
4.  The service sends “Finished”. The TLS authentication is completed and a 
session is established. 
5. The service creates a new KeyNote Session that will be used for user’s 
authorization. 
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6. The service provides the required policy to KeyNote database to be used to 
verify the client’s credentials later. 
7. The client provides his credential to the service. 
8. The service adds this credential to the KeyNote database. 
9. The service replies the result of adding the credentials to the user. 
10. The client requests the service for an action. Example: The client requests the 
service to list the available services. 
11. The service provides the KeyNote, the current set of action attributes such as 
domain in which this application is used, room in which the service runs, 
current Time and the method requested by the client. 
12.  The Service queries the KeyNote for authorizing the action requested by the 
client. 
13. The KeyNote engine verifies the credential against its current set of attributes 
and returns the result to the Service. 
14. The Service determines whether to perform the action requested by the client 
or not depending on the result from the KeyNote engine. If the Service 
performs the action, it returns the result to the client. Else, it returns an 
“Access Denied” to the client. 
Figure 3.5 shows the sequence of actions when an ACE client contacts the Directory 
Service.  
This chapter described the security features of ACE namely enhanced RMI for 
communication, TLS authentication and KeyNote authorization that are required for 
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multi-owner environment including a discussion on choice of KeyNote over 
Kerberos.  The RMI, communication and TLS authentication are used as such for the 
communication of the sensor elements in the multi-owner architecture, but extensions 
are made to ACE authorization mechanism to meet the security requirements of 
multi-owner environment and these extensions are discussed in the next chapter. 
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4  Extending ACE for Access Control for Multi-Owner 
Architecture 
 
KeyNote authorization is based on the action attributes in the credentials. A 
user is authorized if the conditions in the credential match the current set of action 
attributes that the service provides the KeyNote engine. It would be a significant 
challenge to define a set of attribute names and the meaning and syntax associated 
with the values for each one that would effectively address the requirements for an 
ever growing number of organizations and sensor devices. Instead we propose a core 
action attribute set for the multi-owner architecture by extending the action attribute 
set provided by ACE. This chapter describes the limitations of ACE and the extension 
made to the ACE set of action attributes for the multi-owner architecture.  
 
4.1 Limitations in the ACE Framework 
The integration of KeyNote into the ACE framework ensures that each client 
invocation of a service method is authorized.  This provides a firm foundation and a 
base for access control in the Sensor Network environment.  There is no possibility to 
invoke a service method without providing a KeyNote credential for allowing 
authorization. However, the action attribute set utilized by services in the ACE 
framework is directly embedded at a low level in the program infrastructure.  This set 
of action attributes is limited, and does not allow the flexibility to conveniently define 
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credentials that will provide controlled access to a wide variety of sensors in the 
multi-owner environment. 
4.1.1  Current Set of Action Attributes in ACE 
The set of attributes provided by ACE for access control include: 
a. APP_DOMAIN – Domain for which these credentials are used. 
b. Time – Time of request 
c. Method – Method requested to be performed on the device 
d. Room – Room in which the device is found 
Sensor Network involves distribution of credentials with different levels of 
specificity, i.e., it involves situations requiring a single credential for a group of 
devices and situations involving credential for a particular action of a device. ACE 
cannot define a credential that allows client to execute some method, xxx, on only 
one of two devices in the same room (because we cannot distinguish between devices 
of the same type in the same room). It cannot provide a user with “read” access to all 
devices in a room, it would be necessary to identify all the methods for all types of 
devices in the room and include them all in the credential thus making the credential 
large.  
4.2  Extension to the ACE Set of Action Attributes 
The above set of action attributes have to be extended to provide a broader set 
of action attributes to support more expressive conditions in KeyNote credentials. 
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This section describes the names, syntax and meaning of the core action attribute set 
for the multi-owner architecture along with a mechanism for extending this set. 
4.2.1   Core Action Attributes for Multi-Owner Architecture 
The new set of action attributes include: 
1. APP_DOMAIN – Domain for which these credentials are used. This 
attribute is retained from the current set. 
2. ServiceClassHierarchy - Full Java class hierarchy path for the service 
performing the action. 
3. MachineName - The name of the machine in which the service is 
running. 
4. Method - Simple (not full) Java method name the client is attempting to 
execute. This attribute is retained from the current set. 
5. FirstArgValue - Specialized attribute assigned the value of the first 
argument supplied to the method to be executed, provided that the method 
has at least one argument; and the first argument is an instance of class 
String, otherwise it is empty 
6. Role - Attribute identifies a general level of device control that the client 
must be authorized to perform an action.  It is assigned a value from the 
following set of alternatives: 
• Reader – one who can retrieve information from the device 
• Writer – one who can load information on to the device 
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• Administrator – one who can perform (almost) any action on the 
device 
• No role attribute is acknowledged for the specialized action. 
The attribute Role, is used to identify meaningful groupings of service 
methods.  The values associated with this attribute is widely used and well 
understood.   
Each action (method) performed that the Sensor service provides, is 
associated with the Role requirement:  
1. Reader is allowed to view information from the service/device, for 
example, getSensorReading(). 
2. Writer is allowed to execute methods which modify the state of the 
device/service and are intended for usage by a range of clients, for 
example, setSensorProfile(newProfile). 
3. Administrator is allowed to perform almost all methods provided by 
the service.  This role implicitly provides access to all methods 
permitted to either “Reader” or “Writer” as well as methods that are 
reserved for a client with a higher level of authorization, for example, 
resetSensor().  The credential will state what role the holder of the 
credential could perform on the device. The role could be 
combinations of “OR”s when the holder could do multiple roles on the 
device. If the client is an “Administrator” the credential will say (Role 
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== “Reader” || Role == “Writer” || Role ==”Administrator”) as  the 
“Administrator” role supersets the role of  “Reader” and “Writer”.   
4.  Methods in the system might have either “Reader”, “Writer”, 
“Administrator” roles or no role associated with them. Methods that 
have a role associated could only be accessed by the user carrying that 
particular role in their credential. For example: a user with “Reader” 
role will be able to access a method that has an associated “Reader” 
role attribute. It should be noted here that the user need not have that 
method name mentioned in his credential. However, for accessing 
those methods which DO NOT have a role attribute associated with 
them can ONLY be accessed by explicitly mentioning the method 
name in a user’s credential. Figure 4.1 shows a credential of user 
whose role is an “Administrator”.  
 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Authorizer: "x509-base64:MIIEBzCC..” 
Licensees: "x509-base64:MIIECjC..” 
Conditions:  
(( app_domain == “SensorNet”) && ( Provider == “ITTC” ) &&   
(Time <= “1151465644580” && Time >= “1161465647580”) &&  
(ServiceID == “ChemicalSensor001”) && (Role == “Administrator” || 
Role == “Reader” || Role == “Writer”)) Æ “allow”; 
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:XQZopw..” 
Figure 4.1: A credential where the user has a role “Administrator” on a 
Chemical Sensor. 
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It is also to be carefully noted that this “Administrator” role is different 
from the “Super Administrator” in the system that has a system-wide 
access. Figure 4.2 shows the assertion for a Super Administrator. 
 
KeyNote-version: 2 
authorizer: POLICY 
local-constants: KEY1 = "x509-base64:MIIEZzCCA...LCSG0N2ICh" 
licensees: KEY1 
conditions: (APP_DOMAIN == "SensorNet") -> _MAX_TRUST; 
                        Figure 4.2: A policy of a Super Administrator. 
 
It is now clear that although a user might have the role of 
“Administrator”, he will not be able to access every method in the 
system. The method shutdown() on all the sensors could be an 
example of such a priviledged method that needs special mention in 
the credential. Considering an emergency scenario, a user can get 
access to perform ONLY THIS priviledged method on all the sensors 
of all the Organizations.  He can be given a credential in which case 
the credential should be signed by a trusted third party trusted by all 
the Organizations.  
The credential would need to include a condition:  
(ServiceClassHierarchy == “<full-hierarchy-spec>” && Method == 
“shutdown”).  
Each Organization needs to decide the set of such priviledged methods 
that needs special mention in the credentials. 
7. ServiceID – A unique identification for each instance of a service. 
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8. Time - Time of request. This attribute is retained from the current set. 
Of the above set of attributes, attributes that identify the actions that the client can 
perform include: ServiceClassHierarchy, MachineName, Method, FirstArgValue and 
Role. Attribute that identify the set of devices or the services that the client can talk is 
ServiceID.  
Based on their nature, the above set of action attributes can also be classified into two 
categories: 
1. External Attributes 
 
2. Internal Attributes 
 
4.2.1.1 External Attributes 
Attributes that are placed outside the service program are external to the 
service. The majority of the attributes listed in this document are static (do not 
change for a service or device) for the duration of the service session, in particular all 
those that relate to identifying the device/service.  Therefore, these (name, value) 
pairs can be stored in a file and read when the service starts.  This approach provides 
much more flexibility of the owner of a device to control the syntax for attribute 
values (such as DeviceName) and even the number of attribute (name, value) pairs.  
Providing additional elements to the action attribute set will never cause a previously 
valid credential to fail. Since this file has a direct effect on which credentials will be 
valid (or fail) for the associated service, it is critical that access to this file be 
carefully controlled.  Few examples of external static attributes are “ServiceID” that 
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does not change for a service, “APP_DOMAIN” that does not change for an 
Organization. There are no external dynamic attributes as attributes that are dynamic 
can be only obtained programmatically and thus cannot be outside a service.  
4.2.1.2 Internal Attributes 
Attributes that can be obtained programmatically by the service are internal to 
the service. Internal attributes can be either static or dynamic.  
Static Internal Attributes:  Attributes that do not change for a service such as the 
service class hierarchy, Java package name and machine name of the computer in 
which the service runs are static for a service, but changes from one service to 
another. For example: “ServiceClassHierarchy” and “MachineName” that are 
obtained in the program once the service is started and registered with the Service 
Directory. Since these attributes are obtained programmatically, this set of action 
attributes and their value syntax are more difficult to change or extend (requires 
program modification).  
Dynamic Internal Attributes:  Most of the elements of the action attribute set are 
static.  Those that are related to identifying the specific method the client requests to 
execute such as, “Method”, “FirstArgValue” and “Role” associated with each method 
are not, however.  Likewise, the attribute “Time” changes with each request. These 
elements of the action attribute set must also be assigned programmatically. 
Therefore, the dynamic elements of the action attribute list and their value syntax are 
also significantly more difficult to change or extend (requires program modification).  
Testing and evaluation has shown that there will be little need to modify this set. 
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4.2.2   Examples 
A few examples of the credential with the new set of action attributes showing their 
granularity and their expressiveness are given below. 
Example - 1:  
 
Consider a case where there is a user from Organization “A” who owns one particular 
sensor. This user is the administrator of this sensor. With cross-domain 
communication, he could be given access to read sensor data from all sensors of a 
particular type owned by a different Organization “B” in the network. Figure 4.3 
shows the credential that could be given in such a case. The user has an 
“Administrator” role on one particular Chemical Sensor owned by his Organization 
“ITTC” and a “Reader” role on all cameras owned by Organization “EECS”.  
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Authorizer: "x509-base64:MIIEBzCC..” 
Licensees: "x509-base64:MIIECjC..” 
Comment: The user of this credential has a “Reader” role on all cameras of 
Organization “EECS” and “Administrator” role on one particular Chemical Sensor of 
Organization “ITTC”. 
Conditions:  
( ( app_domain == “SensorNet”) && ( Provider == “EECS” ) && 
 (Time <= “1151465644580” && Time >= “1161465647580”) &&  
( ServiceClassHierarchy ~= "^.*Camera$”) && ( Role == “Reader”) ) Æ “allow”; 
(( app_domain == “SensorNet”)  && (Provider == “ITTC”) &&   
(Time <= “1151465644580” && Time >= “1161465647580”) &&  
(ServiceID == “ChemicalSensor001”) && (Role == “Administrator” || Role == 
“Reader” || Role ==”Writer”)) Æ “allow”; 
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:XQZopw..” 
Figure 4.3: A credential where the Authorizer delegates the Licensees “Reader” role 
on all cameras and “Administrator” role on one particular Chemical Sensor. 
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The use of regular expressions in KeyNote credentials avoids listing all the cameras 
of Organization “EECS”, and the attribute “Role” clearly defines what the user can do 
with each of these organizations. 
For the first clause, the ActionAttributeSet file will contain: 
Provider = “EECS” 
ServiceID = “VCC3Camera009” 
And the internal attributes that should result in an “allow” will be: 
 Time = “1151465647580” 
 Role = “Reader” 
Method = “getCameraTiltAngle” 
ServiceClassHierarchy = “SecureUnicastSever.Base.Service. 
                                          Device.PTZCamera.VCC3Camera” 
 MachineName = “barney.ittc.ku.edu” 
For the second clause, the ActionAttributeSet file will contain: 
Provider = “ITTC” 
ServiceID = “ChemicalSensor001” 
And the internal attributes that should result in an “allow” will be: 
 Time = “1151465647590” 
 Role = “Administrator” 
Method = “resetSensor” 
ServiceClassHierarchy = “SecureUnicastSever.Base.Service. 
                                          Device.ChemicalSensor.Nose” 
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 MachineName = “terbium.ittc.ku.edu” 
 
Example - 2:  
Consider a case where an Organizer collects data from databases of Organization A 
and Organization B and maintains a database of his own. Figure 4.4 shows the 
credential that can be used in such a case. The user can read sensor data from a 
Sensor Database of Organization “ITTC” and modify a Service Directory database of 
Organization “EECS”. 
 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Authorizer: "x509-base64:MIIEBzCC..” 
Licensees: "x509-base64:MIIECjC..” 
Conditions:  
(( app_domain == “SensorNet”) && ( Provider == “EECS” ) &&   
(Time <= “1151465644580” && Time >= “1161465647580”) &&  
(ServiceID == “ServiceDirectory001”) && (Role == “Writer”)) Æ “allow”; 
 
(( app_domain == “SensorNet”)  && (Provider == “ITTC”) &&   
(Time <= “1151465644580” && Time >= “1161465647580”) &&  
(ServiceID == “SensorDatabase002”) && (Role == “Reader”)) Æ “allow”; 
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:XQZopw..” 
Figure 4.4: A credential where the user can modify Service Directory database and 
can read sensor data from a Sensor Database. 
 
The credential is simple and captured all the attributes required to identify the 
Organizer’s action with both the organizations. 
 
Example - 3:  
Consider a case of a typical action of a Collector collecting data from a sensor and 
updating a Sensor Database belonging to his organization.  Figure 4.5 shows the 
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credential that can be used in such a case. The collector can read sensor data from a 
Radiological Sensor and update a Sensor Database of Organization “ITTC”. 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Authorizer: "x509-base64:MIIEBzCC..” 
Licensees: "x509-base64:MIIECjC..” 
Conditions:  
(( app_domain == “SensorNet”) && ( Provider == “ITTC” ) &&   
(Time <= “1151465644580” && Time >= “1161465647580”) &&  
((ServiceID == “RadiologicalSensor001”) && (Role == “Reader”))  || 
((ServiceID == “SensorDatabase002”) && (Role == “Writer”))) Æ “allow”; 
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:XQZopw..” 
 
Figure 4.5: A credential where a collector can read sensor data from a Radiological 
sensor and update a Sensor Database. 
 
The credential is simple and any user holding this credential will be able to identify 
for what this credential was intended by reading through it. 
 
 
Example - 4:  
 
Consider a case where a Collector configures a sensor and collects data from the 
sensor belonging to his organization. Figure 4.6 shows the credential that can be used 
for this case. The Collector has the role “Reader” or “Writer” access on the 
temperature sensor in a computer “sentinel.ittc.ku.edu”. 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Authorizer: "x509-base64:MIIEBzCC..” 
Licensees: "x509-base64:MIIECjC..” 
Conditions:  
(( app_domain == “SensorNet”) && ( Provider == “ITTC” ) &&  
 (Time <= “1151465644580”  && Time >= “1161465647580”) &&  
(ServiceID == “TemperatureSensor350”) && (MachineName == 
“sentinel.ittc.ku.edu”) && (Role == “Reader” || Role == “Writer”) ) Æ “allow”; 
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:XQZopw..” 
Figure 4.6: A credential of user with “Reader”/“Writer” role on a Temperature sensor. 
  39
Listing all the methods that the temperature sensor provides for configuring and 
methods to read sensor data from the sensor would result in a large credential. With 
the use of “Role” attribute, the credential captured the requirement of the Collector in 
a single line. The attribute “MachineName” identifies the computer on which the 
sensor service is available. 
The corresponding ActionAttributeSet file will contain: 
Provider = “ITTC” and  ServiceID = “TemperatureSensor350” 
And the internal attributes that should result in an “allow” will be: 
 Time = “1151465647580” 
 Role = “Reader” 
ServiceClassHierarchy= 
“SecureUnicastServer.Base.Service.Device.Sensor.TemperatureSensor” 
 Method = “getCurrentTemperature” 
 MachineName = “sentinel.ittc.ku.edu” 
If the collector requests for method “setScale(“Celsius”)”, then the internal attributes 
that should result in an “allow” will be: 
 Time = “1151465647580” 
 Role = “Writer”   
ServiceClassHierarchy= 
“SecureUnicastSever.Base.Service.Device.Sensor.TemperatureSensor” 
 Method = “setScale” and MachineName = “sentinel.ittc.ku.edu”   
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Example - 5:   
 
Consider a case of an emergency where the user is given permissions to shut down all 
the sensors of all organizations. Figure 4.7 shows the credential that can be used in 
such a case. All the organizations have a trust relationship with the authorizer of this 
credential. The user has rights to perform the privileged method “shutdown” on all 
the sensors of Organization “EECS” and “ITTC”. 
 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Authorizer: "x509-base64:MIIA..” 
Licensees: "x509-base64:MIIECjC..” 
Conditions:  
(( app_domain == “SensorNet”) && ( Provider == “ITTC” || Provider == “EECS” ) 
&&   
(Time <= “1151465644580” && Time >= “1161465647580”) &&  
(ServiceClassHierarchy~= "^.*Sensor$”)”) && (Method == “shutdown”)) Æ 
“allow”; 
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:XQZopw..” 
Figure 4.7: A credential where the user can perform only one method on all the 
sensors.  
 
The examples provided in this section described the use of the new set of action 
attributes proposed for the multi-owner architecture. It was shown that this new set of 
action attributes helps expressing the credential in a simple and meaningful way. 
 
This chapter described the extensions that were made to ACE set of action attributes 
to meet the granularity required for access control within the context of a single 
organization. However, additional challenges arise when more than one organization 
is involved with regards to credential distribution and delegation of trust. The next 
chapter discusses these issues. 
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5  Access Control in Multi-Owner Environment 
 
The access control sub system of the architecture follows a “Take-grant 
Protection Model” [29], where in the user presents his capability to request an action. 
This is in contrast to “Rule Set Based Access Control” model [30], where in the 
system trust the user’s discretion in performing an action. While the latter is desired 
and sufficient for a tightly coupled system (e.g., Linux Kernel), the former is more 
useful for a loosely coupled distributed system like sensor networks. The core of the 
access control subsystem is the ability to issue the authorization information the form 
of a “credential”. However, when we analyze the presentation of credentials during 
service access, and the granularity of controlled objects, the following questions are 
exposed:  
1. How to verify a user identity? 
2. Who issues credentials across organizations? 
3. How does the access control mechanism work when a user talks to a sensor 
belonging to his organization? 
4. How does the access control mechanism work when a user talks to a sensor 
belonging to a different organization? 
It is known that in public key cryptography, the users have public keys. Public keys 
are accessible by anyone in the network. CA is used in combination with certificates 
and protocols to provide authentication and authorization functions. We assume that 
each organization maintains its own CA.  The CA issues certificates which are signed 
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messages that map the user and his public key. CA is the public key equivalent of 
KDC. 
Broadly the functions of CA include: 
1. Signing the public keys of the users 
2. Creating credentials for users to talk to devices 
5.1 Scenario with CA from a Single Organization  
Considering the access control mechanism in a single organization, there is one CA 
that issues certificates and credentials to users in this organization. The role of CA 
ends with issuing the credential and the certificates. The CA need not be contacted 
when a user authenticates and establishes session with the sensor service assuming 
that the service trusts the public key of the CA. It is enough if the authenticating 
sensor service knows and trusts the public key certificate of the CA for signature 
verification. The issued certificates and credentials remain with the user. When a user 
requests for a credential to access devices, the CA must be aware of the list of sensor 
services and functionalities of each of the service that the organization provides. If the 
CA does not know the specifics of a service, then it cannot generate a credential that 
provides fine-grained access control. The extensions to KeyNote credentials 
discussed in the previous chapter poses a constraint on the CA.  Each service has a set 
of functions and the role that is required for perform that action. Every time there is a 
change in the service, the Credential Author (or CA) has to talk to the Service Author 
to get the information on the new capabilities and their corresponding roles. In the 
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current prototype, this interaction between the CA and the Service Author occurs 
manually. This interaction can be automated by developing a utility that helps the 
Credential Author to look up the service and list the current set of methods and their 
roles. 
5.1.1   Revocation of Public Key Certificates and Credentials 
All public key certificates have an issue date and expiration date. This interval 
is determined by the organization. The typical validity interval is about a year, to 
avoid the nuisance of renewing certificates with smaller validity periods. The 
revocation becomes more pronounced in the event of users entering and leaving the 
organization, for example: a user getting fired while he still holds a certificate that is 
not yet expired.  
A solution to certificate revocation could be to use Certificate Revocation Lists 
(CRL). A CRL is a list of serial numbers that should not be honored. A certificate is 
valid only if: 
• It has a valid CA signature 
• Not yet expired 
• Not listed in the recent CRL    
The authenticating service should check the recent CRL as a part of the authentication 
handshake. The use of X.509 certificates for TLS authentication provides an easier 
way to tackle this problem. Any X.509 public key certificate has a serial number 
along with the version, signature algorithm identifier, validity period, issuer, subject, 
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public key of subject. The CA that creates the certificate is responsible for assigning 
it a serial number to distinguish it from other certificates it issues. When a certificate 
is revoked, its serial number is placed in a Certificate Revocation List (CRL). The 
prototype implemented here does not provide a solution for the above problem, but 
considers the pros and cons of using Certificate Revocation Lists as a part of the 
future research tasks. 
With KeyNote, credentials are monotonic. Removal of an assertion does not cause an 
increase or decrease in the compliance value. KeyNote strictly does not support 
negative credential (credential that can invalidate the credential already given). 
Hence, once a credential is issued, it is valid until the credential expires, and cannot 
be revoked.  This might create a problem when there are misbehaving users in the 
system resulting in insecure access control. The presence of misbehaving users 
determines the significance of revocation. 
5.2 Scenario with CAs from Multiple Organizations 
Considering a scenario where there are multiple organizations A, B and C. Each 
organization has its own CA to issue certificates and credentials to its users. In a 
sensor network with multiple owners, it is likely to see that a user from one 
organization would be talking to devices owned by other organizations. Considering a 
case where a user from an organization A wants to talk to devices from Organization 
B and C.   He cannot use his public key certificate signed by his own CA with a 
service from a different organization, if there is no trust relationships between the 
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organizations. A straight forward solution to such a case will be that the user to 
contact each of the Certificate authorities individually.  
 
 
Figure 5.1:  A scenario showing the complexity when a user contacts CA of different 
organizations individually for credentials. 
 
 
The user from Organization A contacts the CA of organization B. He gets his public 
key certified by this CA. Then he places his request for accessing the sensor of 
organization B and gets a credential. He uses this credential to talk to the sensor 
service of Organization B.  This transforms into scenario of a single CA within an 
organization, as the user holds a separate public key certificate and credential for 
Organization B. He repeats the above steps with Organization C to talk to sensor 
service of Organization C. The current prototype implementation has a framework to 
demonstrate this solution.  
But there are serious disadvantages of using such a straight forward solution: 
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• When the user wants to talk to multiple devices from multiple organizations, 
then he has to get his public key certified by CA of each organization. The 
user has to maintain a large set of his public key files signed by each of the 
CA. Users will have difficulty in managing huge number of such files. 
• Similarly, the user has to get one credential for each of the organizations. This 
is highly not scalable and inefficient as the user has to manage and know what 
file to present to a service. Figure 5.1 describes the complexity of contacting 
multiple CA individually for credentials. 
• The users must know the presence of all the different CA in the network. 
• Moreover, the CA of a different organization may not trust this user and may 
not sign his public key. 
 
5.3 Proposed Solution  
The above scenario presents the difficulties of authentication and authorization 
during a cross organization service access. We can address these by introducing two 
entities: a Trusted Third Party (TTP) and a Broker. The primary function of a TTP in 
the architecture is to enable users to authenticate across various domains, whereas the 
function of a Broker is to provide a user with authorization for a requested action on 
behalf of participating organizations. The roles are complementary and distinct. In 
reality both of these roles can be assumed by any user of the system or an outside 
entity who is able and trusted.  The following sections describe the role and use of 
TTP and Broker in more detail. 
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5.3.1 Authentication using TTP 
In the absence of a trust relationship between users and services belonging to 
different organizations, we need a TTP to establish such a relationship for 
authentication purposes. This section outlines the steps involved in achieving such an 
authentication scenario. 
5.3.1.1 Role of a TTP 
A  TTP facilitates authentication between organizations that trust it. They use this 
trust to identify the users among organizations. The role of a TTP is issuing public 
key certificates to CAs of the trusting organizations. A CA, in turn issues public key 
certificates to users within its organization.  
5.3.1.2 Limitations in the Current Authentication Handshake 
The authentication in ACE is achieved using a CA for each organization. The CA of 
each organization has a self-signed certificate.  A self-signed certificate is one for 
which the issuer (signer) is the same as the subject (the entity whose public key is 
being certified). Users within the same organization are certified by the CA, and 
hence are trusted by the services within the organization. A user from another 
organization cannot authenticate to these services, as the services do not have any 
knowledge about the CA of that organization. Hence, the current authentication setup 
is limited to users within the same organization and cannot accomplish a cross-
domain communication. The establishment of certificates used in the current setup is 
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extended using “Chain of Trust” provided by the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to 
achieve the cross-domain authentication which is discussed in the next section.  
5.3.1.3 Authentication using a Chain of Trust 
 
Consider a scenario where two Organizations A and B requires cross-domain 
authentication. The TTP is trusted by both of these organizations. The TTP has a self-
signed certificate. The TTP signs the public keys of the CAs of both the organization. 
The certificate issued by the TTP and the self-signed certificate of the TTP forms the 
certificate chain identifying the CA. 
    Figure 5.2:  A scenario using a TTP. 
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User Alice has her public key certified by CA of Organization A. Similarly, User Bob 
has his public key certified by CA of Organization B. At the bottom of a certificate 
chain is the certificate issued by the CA authenticating the user’s public key. The next 
certificate in the chain is one that authenticates the CA's public key, which is the 
certificate issued by the TTP. The chain ends with the self-signed certificate of the 
TTP. These three certificates form the “Chain of Trust” which is indicated as a 
hierarchy of certificates as shown in the figure 5.2. Each certificate in the chain (after 
the first) thus authenticates the public key of the signer of the previous certificate in 
the chain. When a service from Organization A is presented with a certificate chain 
from a user Bob, the service can authenticate Bob as there is a common signer among 
their CA and the user. The chain of trust is established here using the Java Keytool 
[31], which is the key and certificate management utility. It enables users to 
administer their own public/private key pairs and associated certificates for use in 
authentication. The top-level TTP certificate is self-signed. However, the trust into 
the TTP’s public key does not come from the self-signed certificate itself (anybody 
could generate a self-signed certificate). The reason that the public key is stored in a 
certificate is because this is the format understood by most tools, so the certificate in 
this case is only used as a "vehicle" to transport the TTP’s public key. Before the TTP 
certificate is accepted to create the chain using keytool, the certificate is printed and 
the displayed fingerprint is compared with the well-known fingerprint (securely 
acquiring the finger print requires out-of-band steps) for correctness.  
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Thus, the cross-domain authentication is achieved using a common TTP. The next 
section describes the approach used for authorizing actions among organizations. 
 
5.3.2 Authorization using Broker 
The procedure above achieves user authentication across multiple organizations. This 
however is not sufficient. A user still needs authorization information, i.e., the 
credential to access a service. The following sub-section details how cross-domain 
service access can be achieved.  
5.3.2.1  Role of a Broker: 
A Broker is an entity who can issue credentials on-behalf of a CA. The Broker 
can be the single point of contact so that the users do not have to contact CAs of 
multiple organizations. The CA of an organization can delegate his rights of issuing 
credentials to the Broker. The Broker can act as the “delegated CA”. The Broker must 
maintain a trusted relationship with every CA of all organizations that delegates their 
authority of issuing credentials. 
5.3.2.2 Delegating Authorization with KeyNote Trust Management  
Authorization using Broker is achieved using the delegation of credentials supported 
by the KeyNote Trust Management. Anyone who has a valid credential can delegate 
his rights to another user by issuing a credential. For example, a user “Alice” from an 
Organization “ITTC” has access to a Nose Service from 12.00 pm to 6.00 pm on 
10/07/07.
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KeyNote-Version: 2 
Authorizer: "x509-base64:MIIEBzCC..” 
Licensees: "x509-base64:MIIECjC..” 
Conditions:  
(( app_domain == “SensorNet”) && ( Provider == “ITTC” ) &&  
 (Time <= “1151465644580”  && Time >= “1161465647580”) &&  
(ServiceID == “NicholsHallNoseService001”) && (MachineName == 
“sentinel.ittc.ku.edu”) && (Role == “Reader”)) Æ “allow”; 
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:XQZopw..” 
Figure 5.3: A credential issued to user Alice to access Nose Service.  
 
Figure 5.3 shows the credential issued to Alice. User Alice decides to delegate her 
rights to User David of the same organization, to access the Nose Service from 1.00 
pm to 5.00 pm on 11/07/07. She creates a credential and signs with her private key. 
This delegated credential is shown in the figure 5.4. 
 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Authorizer: "x509-base64: MIIECjC..” 
Licensees: "x509-base64:MIIZAkA..” 
Conditions:  
(( app_domain == “SensorNet”) && ( Provider == “ITTC” ) &&  
 (Time <= “1151465644685”  && Time >= “1161465647980”) &&  
(ServiceID == “NicholsHallNoseService001”) && (MachineName == 
“sentinel.ittc.ku.edu”) && (Role == “Reader”)) Æ “allow”; 
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:XQZopw..” 
Figure 5.4: A delegated credential issued from Alice to David to access the Nose 
Service. 
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David has to provide the delegated credential given in the figure 5.4 and also the 
credential issued to Alice given in the figure 5.3 to get authorized from the Nose 
Service.  
 
 Figure 5.5:  A scenario showing the use of a Broker. 
 
The trust relationship between CA of an organization and the Broker is established by 
issuing a credential. The CA issues a credential to the Broker delegating his rights of 
issuing credentials. When a user requires a credential to talk to a device from another 
organization, he contacts the Broker. The Broker issues a credential to this user 
delegating the rights to access the device. Usually credentials stay with the users and 
the CA does not keep track of the issued credentials.  In this case, the user has to 
provide the Service: 1) the credential issued to the Broker for authorizing the Broker 
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and 2) his credential issued by the Broker. This causes difficulty in managing 
credentials when the user wishes to talk to devices from multiple organizations and 
does not provide any solution or improvements to the scalability issue discussed in 
the previous scenario. Hence, a copy of the credential issued to the Broker is retained 
by the CA and provided to any service on service startup just like the Policy 
authorizing the CA. This allows the Service, or particularly the KeyNote engine to 
know that the organization trusts the Broker as an authority, apart from their CA. The 
user can provide only his credential to the Service. When the user requests for access 
to devices from multiple organizations, the Broker can issue one credential 
authorizing all the requested devices. Thus, the user is required to carry only one 
credential sufficient to talk to devices from multiple organizations as shown in the 
figure 5.5. This approach simplifies the scalability issue presented in the previous 
scenario. The organizations can decide on the services it wishes to advertise and be 
used by the users of other organizations. The CA of the organization can issue 
credentials to the Broker only for these services, which can be delegated to users of 
other organization. This approach is flexible as the organization has control on what 
services are external and internal to the organization.  
5.3.2.2.1 Limitations  
 
The credential of a Broker provides him with a delegated authority to access services 
under the conditions mentioned in it. This implies that a broker becomes a valid user 
of the system who can access the services just as well as the CA who issued it, or any 
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other authorized user. This condition may not however be desirable, if the Broker is 
required by the multi-owner architecture, not to be able to access the service himself. 
However such a condition cannot be represented by KeyNote as it does not have 
feature to provide a “meta-credential”, i.e., a credential saying that an entity is 
authorized to issue “credentials”. The delegation from the broker to a user can then be 
achieved by issuing credential with conditions which forms a proper subset of the 
conditions contained in the broker’s credential. Even so, there is no mechanism 
within KeyNote to verify whether the conditions in a user’s credential forms correct 
subset of those in Broker’s credential during the time of issue.  And a faulty 
credential is identified only when the credential is used for service access. Faulty 
credentials can be avoided if the Broker has the complete details about the list of 
services available, method to role mappings and the policies enforced by the 
organizations before issuing a credential.  
5.3.2.3  Example  
Consider a case where an Organizer from Organization C wishes to collect data from 
databases of Organization A and Organization B and maintain a database of his own. 
The steps that are required to achieve this case are: 
Step 1: The Broker should have a trust relationship with the CA of Organization A, B 
and C. Each Organization issues a separate credential to the Broker representing this 
trust. The following figure 5.6 represents the trust relationship between the Broker 
and CA of Organization A, where the CA allows the Broker to delegate access to a 
particular Sensor Database service.  The Sensor Database service is provided with 
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this credential to indicate the KeyNote engine, that they trust the Broker apart from 
their CA.  
 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Comment: CA-OrgA delegates authority to Broker for access to a particular 
SensorDatabase Service 
Authorizer: CA-OrgA “x509-base64:MIIEBzCC..”  
Licensees: Broker "x509-base64:MIIECjC..” 
Conditions:  
(( app_domain == “SensorNet”) && ( Provider == “Organization-A” ) &&   
(Time <= “1151465644580” && Time >= “1161465647580”) &&  
(ServiceID == “SensorDatabase002”))Æ “allow”; 
 
Figure 5.6: Trust relationship between CA-OrgA and Broker. 
 
Similarly, the Organization B provides a credential to the Broker which is shown in 
figure 5.7. Figure 5.7 shows that the Broker is allowed to delegate “Reader” 
privileges on all the Database services provided by this organization.  
 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Comment: CA-OrgB delegates authority to Broker for “Reader” access to all 
Database services. 
Authorizer: CA-OrgB “x509-base64:MIIEBzCC..”  
Licensees: Broker "x509-base64:MIIECjC..” 
Conditions:  
(( app_domain == “SensorNet”) && ( Provider == “Organization-B” ) &&   
(Time <= “1151465644580” && Time >= “1161465647580”) &&  
(ServiceID == "^.*Database.*$") && (Role == “Reader”))Æ “allow”; 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Trust relationship between CA-Organization B and Broker.  
 
Step 2: The Organizer contacts the Broker and requests the Broker to issue a 
credential to read Sensor information from the databases owned by Organization A 
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and B. The Broker can issue one credential meeting the requirements of the 
Organizer. Figure 5.8 shows the credential that can be used in such a case. 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Authorizer: Broker  "x509-base64:MIIEBzCC..” 
Licensees: Organizer"x509-base64:MIIECjC..” 
Conditions:  
(( app_domain == “SensorNet”) && ( Provider == “OrganizationA” ) &&   
(Time <= “1151465644580” && Time >= “1161465647580”) &&  
(ServiceID == “SensorDatabase002”) && (Role == “Reader”)) Æ “allow”; 
 
(( app_domain == “SensorNet”)  && (Provider == “Org-B”) &&   
(Time <= “1151465644580” && Time >= “1161465647580”) &&  
(ServiceID == " SensorDatabase001") && (Role == “Reader”)) Æ “allow”; 
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:XQZopw..” 
Figure 5.8: A credential issued by the Broker where the Organizer can read from 
Sensor Databases of Organization A and B. 
  
Step 3: The Organizer contacts the Database Services and provides this credential for 
authorization. 
 
The above scenarios represent the possible situations in a practical multi-owner 
application. In order to understand the implementation issues that might arise to 
deploy a working model, a prototype was implemented. The following chapter 
discusses the prototype in detail. 
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6  Prototype Implementation 
A prototype was developed to demonstrate and verify the proof-of-concept of the 
proposed access control framework for the multi-owner architecture. It required 
identifying different functional components as various implementation modules. This 
chapter describes the various components of the prototype.  
6.1 Overview 
Figure 6.1 shows the prototype of the architecture that was implemented. 
 
Figure 6.1:  An architecture for Prototype implementation. 
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The tasks that were required to demonstrate the proof-of-concept of the architecture 
include: 
• Device Layer: Selecting a sensor and developing a sample sensor service 
controlling the sensor. The sensor chosen was Cyranose as it was easy to 
program with sufficient features to demonstrate access control in a multi 
ownership environment. The service chosen was termed the Nose Service 
to be consistent with the service it provides. The Nose Service controls the 
Cyranose by downloading smell profiles which represents the control of 
Sensor Service on the Sensor. The Cyranose replies with the result of the 
actions it performs which represents the response given by the Sensor as 
given in the Section 2.2.1 of the multi-owner Architecture. 
• Repository Layer: Developing a sample Sensor Database, Directory 
Service and Regional Database as given in the Section 2.2.2 of the  
multi-owner architecture. We chose to use the Service Directory and 
Regional Database provided by the ACE infrastructure. We chose to 
establish a Sensor Database of smell profiles used by the Cyranose to 
demonstrate the functionalities of a Sensor Database. 
• Developing a client to talk to the sensor service and sensor database.  We 
chose to develop a Nose Client program to communicate with the Nose 
Service and Sensor Database Service to demonstrate the functionality of 
the “Collector” between the Device and the Repository layer as given in 
the Section 2.2.1. 
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• Application Layer: Setting up CA to demonstrate the distribution of public 
key certificates and credentials as given in the Section 2.2.3.  
• Demonstrating the access control mechanism in the transactions between 
the client, the database and the sensor service using the KeyNote Trust 
Management system. 
6.1.1   Nose Service 
A nose service was written in the ACE framework to communicate with the 
Cyranose. An IEEE 1451 NCAP (Network Capable Application Processor) Server 
[32] was developed and then used to talk to the nose, send and receive commands 
through a mote network.  The Nose service was designed in such a way that this 
NCAP server is a private member of this service so that no intruder can take control 
of this NCAP server to talk to the nose. This service had just one method called 
“execute” to be consistent with the IEEE 1451 sensor specific standard. The Cyranose 
was thus made to be IEEE 1451 complaint. 
The execute method takes the following parameters: 
1. OpId – Operation id, id of the method that has to be executed in the NCAP 
Server. The methods supported are: 
a. Load Profile : Load a new smell profile from the sensor database to 
the nose 
b. Start Identification : Start a new identification in the nose 
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c. Fetch Results: Retrieve the results of the last identification from 
the nose. 
2. Mode – the Operation Mode of the sensor 
3. ArgArray – A container class of input and output parameters such as the 
profile to the loaded and results of the actions (Load Profile, Start 
Identification and Fetch Results) used in communicating with the NCAP 
Server.  
6.1.2   Nose Client  
A Nose Client program was written to provide a user interface to interact with the 
Nose service (connected to a nose device). It provides the user interface components 
to select a profile, load the profile to the device, start a new identification in the 
device, and view the result of the last identification. 
6.1.3   Database Service 
A Sensor Database was created to store smell profiles. The corresponding 
Sensor Database service was also written to facilitate interaction with the database. 
The database consists of a table with fields: 
1. Id : Name of the smell profile (e.g., Coca cola or Isopropyl alcohol) 
2. Profile : Actual smell profile corresponding to the Id. 
The Sensor Database service supported the following operations: 
1. Adding a new profile, 
2. Updating an existing profile, 
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3. Fetching all the profiles from the database, and  
4. Deleting all the profiles from the database. 
6.1.4   Configuring a Certificate Authority 
The administrator “ace” was chosen to be the CA for the system. This CA was 
setup to issue certificates and credentials within the environment. The CA currently 
resides in the “ace” home directory. The CA was setup using a script (setupCA.sh). A 
new OpenSSL directory “CA” was created. 
6.1.5   Configuring Users for the Sensor Network 
 
Figure 6.2:  A CA issuing a public key certificate and a credential to a new user. 
 
Each user created his public-private key pair using the KeyNote keygen tool. The 
keys were rsa-base64 of size 2048 bits. A certificate request was generated to request 
the CA to sign the public key. The CA verified this request and signed the public key. 
This signed public key certificate was given back to the user along with the CA 
certificate as discussed in Chapter 5.1. The user then imported the signed certificate 
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and the CA’s certificate into the key rings for use under TLS and KeyNote using the 
Java keytool [31].  
Figure 6.2 shows the interactions between a new user and the CA while placing a 
request for public key certificate. 
6.1.6   Getting Credentials 
The users in the network requested the CA for access to sensors. The CA 
provided the appropriate credentials using the KeyNote - command line tool for 
KeyNote operations. 
In this current implementation, placing the credential request, verification and issuing 
the credential takes place offline. Figure 6.2 shows the interactions between a user 
and the CA to get a credential. 
6.2 Testing and Results 
The objective of this testing was to demonstrate the interaction of various 
entities: the Nose Service, the Nose Client and the Sensor Database service in a 
secure and controlled access environment. A demonstration portraying the access 
control model with two different clients, each having different rights, trying to use the 
Nose Service was given. 
 
6.2.1   System Configuration 
Figure 6.3 shows the system configuration that was used for this demonstration.  
The following steps describe the demonstration procedure: 
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1. The Service Directory, the Regional Database service and the Sensor 
Database service were executed on one computer (khan.ittc.ku.edu - 
Pentium III 750 MHz processor, 256 MB RAM, 10 GB HDD, Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux WS release 4). 
 
 
Figure 6.3:  Configuration used for the demonstration of access control with     
two clients with different permissions. 
 
2. Nose service was connected to the Cyranose through a multi-hop 
(wireless) Mote network on one computer (dhcp059.ittc.ku.edu - Dell 
Latitude D820, Pentium Dual Core T2500 2.0 GHz, 1 GB RAM, 80GB 
HDD, Fedora Core 5 (2.6.16)). 
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3. Nose client program was executed on one computer (halflife.ittc.ku.edu - 
Pentium III 933 MHz processor, 512 MB RAM, 80 GB HDD, Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux WS release 4). 
4.  User “A” (“satyam”) was given individual credentials to contact the 
Service Directory, Regional Database, Nose Service and Sensor Database. 
He was given permissions to “Load a Profile” with the Nose Service but 
not to “Start the identifications” or “View results”. Figure 6.4 shows the 
credential given to contact the Nose Service: 
 
keynote-version: 2 
authorizer:"x509-base64:MIIEBzC …. " 
local-constants:KEY1="x509base64:MIIECj…" 
licensees: KEY1  
conditions: ((APP_DOMAIN == "SensorNet") && (time >= 
"1152287101810") && (time <= "1183823100000") && (opid == 
"P_NOSEFBLOCK_LOAD_PROFILE") ) -> "true"; 
signature: “sig-rsa-sha1-base64:XQ..” 
 
Figure 6.4:  Credential given to “User A” to contact Nose Service to load a 
profile. 
 
  
         Figure 6.5 shows the credential given to contact the Sensor Database. 
 
Keynote-version: 2 
authorizer:"x509-base64:MIIEBzC …. " 
local-constants:KEY1="x509base64:MIIECj…" 
licensees: KEY1  
conditions: ((APP_DOMAIN == "SensorNet") && (time >= 
"1152287101810") && (time <= "1183823100000")) -> "true"; 
signature: “sig-rsa-sha1-base64:XQ…” 
 
              Figure 6.5:  Credential given to “User A” to contact the ServiceDirectory. 
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5. Another user “B” (“mpradeep”) was given credentials to contact the 
Service Directory, Regional Database and Nose Service. He was given 
permissions to perform “Start Identification” and “View the results” in 
the sensor, but did not have rights to “Load a new profile” in the sensor. 
Figure 6.6 shows the credential given to user “B”. 
 
keynote-version: 2 
authorizer:"x509-base64:MIIEBzC …. " 
local-constants:KEY1="x509base64 MIIECjCC…" 
licensees: KEY1  
conditions: ((APP_DOMAIN == "SensorNet") && (time >= 
"1152287101810") && (time <= "1183823100000") &&  
(opid == " P_NOSEFBLOCK_FETCH_RESULT" ||  opid == 
"P_NOSEFBLOCK_START_IDENTIFICATION)) -> "true"; 
signature: “sig-rsa-sha1-base64:XQ..” 
 
Figure 6.6:  Credential given to “User B” granting access to start a new 
identification and view the results with the Nose Service. 
 
6.2.2   Results 
 
Test Case 1 - User can perform only load profile: 
 
User A used the Nose Client program and contacted the Sensor Database. He selected 
the profile for “Isopropyl alcohol” and contacted the Nose Service to load this profile 
to the nose. This action was performed successfully as the User A had permission to 
load a profile. When user A tried to perform “Start Identification or Fetch Results”, 
he was denied access, as his credentials did not match the action requested. Figures 
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6.7 and 6.8 show the interactions performed by user A with Profile Database and 
Nose service. 
 
 
Figure 6.7:  Test case where User A selected a profile from Sensor database. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8:  Test case where User A was granted access for loading a profile and 
denied access for start identification.  
 
 
Test Case 2 – User can perform start identification and fetch results:  
 
User B requested the Nose Service to start a new identification and this operation was 
granted access as he had credentials to perform this action. User B could not contact 
the Sensor Database service as he did not have credentials to talk to this service. He 
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requested the Nose service for loading a dummy profile and was denied access as 
shown in the figure 6.9. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9:  A test case where User B could perform start a new identification but 
could not load a profile. 
 
The demonstration to show access control was successful. The communication 
between the Nose Client, Nose Service and the Sensor Database service was shown. 
User with valid credential was granted access and user with invalid credential was 
denied access. 
6.2.3   Lessons Learned 
Some of the lessons learned from the demonstration include: 
1. While testing the access control using the credentials, the same credential that was 
used to talk to the Service Directory worked with Sensor Database service. We 
learned that the credentials lacked the capability to distinguish between the 
services.  In the multi-owner architecture, it is possible for two sensor services to 
provide the same function. With the limited set of attributes such as 
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APP_DOMAIN, time, method provided by the ACE environment, the credential 
could distinguish services and method for a specific service. We learned that the 
credentials have to be extended to be more expressive. 
2. The set of action attributes provided by ACE environment were embedded within 
the services. We learned that it was necessary to find a mechanism to externally 
control, add or delete a few set of action attributes. 
3.  There were four different credentials, one for each of the services Service 
Directory, Regional Database, Sensor Database and Nose Service. It would be 
difficult for a user to manage multiple credentials. We learned that with KeyNote 
it was possible to combine multiple credentials into one by providing more 
clauses in the conditions. For example, figure 6.10 shows a single credential with 
two clauses in the conditions, one for contacting the nose service and one for 
contacting the Service Directory to see the list of services available. 
 
 
keynote-version: 2 
authorizer:"x509-base64:MIIEBzC …. " 
local-constants:KEY1="x509base64 MIIECjCC…" 
licensees: KEY1  
conditions:  
((APP_DOMAIN == "SensorNet") && (time >= "1152287101810") && (time 
<= "1183823100000") && (opid == " P_NOSEFBLOCK_FETCH_RESULT" ||  
opid == "P_NOSEFBLOCK_START_IDENTIFICATION)) -> "true"; #clause-1 
 
((APP_DOMAIN == "SensorNet") && (time >= "1152287101810") && (time 
<= "1183823100000") && (method == “getServices”)) -> "true"; #clause-2 
signature: “sig-rsa-sha1-base64:XQ..” 
      Figure 6.10:  An example of a single credential with multiple clauses. 
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4. We learned that the Service Author and the Credential Author need to agree upon 
a standard nomenclature to provide values for attributes such as “OpID” in the 
credential. It was necessary to come up with a set of action attributes and their 
nomenclature that can be used for the multi-owner architecture. 
5. We learned that any computer that has to register with the Service Directory on a 
different computer has to start the RMI registry on its own. We learned to start 
RMI Registry before starting any service. 
 
6.3 Credential Extensions  
The lessons learned from the previous section pointed to the need to extend the set of 
action attributes in ACE to address the large set of devices and actions. Chapter 4 
described the limitation of the set of action attributes used in ACE and the extension 
made to that set to develop a core set of attributes for the multi-owner environment. 
This section describes the prototype of the credential extension and the tests 
performed to demonstrate this extension. 
6.3.1   System Configuration  
The following configuration was setup to demonstrate the credential extensions: 
 
1. Nose Service was chosen as the sensor service for testing. The nose device 
was directly connected to one computer (khan.ittc.ku.edu - Pentium III 750 
MHz processor, 256 MB RAM, 10 GB HDD, Red Hat Enterprise Linux WS 
release 4) using a serial port.   
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2. The Nose service was started by the “ace” administrator. The Nose Service 
was given the ServiceID "NicholsHall_Nose001” by providing an external 
action attribute file. 
3. The Nose client was executed by user “satyam” on one computer 
(halflife.ittc.ku.edu - Pentium III 933 MHz processor, 512 MB RAM, 80 GB 
HDD, Red Hat Enterprise Linux WS release 4). 
Figure 6.11 shows the configuration used for credential extensions. 
 
 
Figure 6.11:  Setup used for demonstrating credential extensions. 
 
6.3.2   Testing and Results 
The user was given multiple credentials. To demonstrate the expressiveness and the 
granularity in the credentials, the credential to the Nose service was changed in each 
test case to show the different possibilities of access control. 
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Test Case 1: A User starts a new identification and view the results but cannot 
load a profile: 
In this test case, the user could only start a new identification and see the result of the 
last identification in the electronic nose, and could not perform any other action as 
given in the figure 6.12.  
 
KeyNote-version: 2 
Authorizer: "x509-base64:MIIEBzC…” 
Licensees: “"x509-base64:MIIECjCCA3OgAw..” 
Conditions: ((APP_DOMAIN == "SensorNet") && (Time >= "1152287101810") 
&&  
(Time<="1183823100000")&&(ServiceClassHierarchy==  
"SecureUnicastServer.Base.Service.Device.SensorNetwork.ChemicalSensor.Nose")&
&  
((Method == “execute”) && (FirstArgValue == 
"P_NOSEFBLOCK_FETCH_RESULT" ||  FirstArgValue == 
"P_NOSEFBLOCK_START_IDENTIFICATION"))) -> "allow";  
Signature: 
            "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:KISi0RAbUlYw1z+dr6oOd8hMagAP\ 
            1nQ2IBgVMNJDenZ1H…” 
Figure 6.12:  A test case where the user could start a new identification, view the 
result but could not load a profile. 
 
Since the method “execute” in the Nose Service is a special method, it does not have 
any role associated with it. Hence the credential specifies the method name explicitly. 
The first argument value identifies the operation that the “execute” method needs to 
perform. 
When the client requests for “Start Identification”, the identification was started and 
the result was show in the result box. Similarly when the client requests for “Fetch 
  72
result”, the result of the last identification was fetched from the nose and displayed in 
the result box. If the user tried any other action, he/she was denied access. 
  
Test Case 2: User has role “Reader” and “Modifier” on one sensor: 
In this test case, the client can modify only one nose service identified by the 
“ServiceID” attribute. The client can switch it ON or turn it OFF according to its 
current power condition, and see the result of the action. Figure 6.13 shows the 
credential provided to the nose service. 
KeyNote-version: 2 
Authorizer: "x509-base64:MIIEBzC…” 
Licensees: “"x509-base64:MIIECjCCA3OgAw..” 
Conditions: ((APP_DOMAIN == "SensorNet") && (Time >= "1152287101810") 
&& (Time <= "1183823100000") && (ServiceID=="NicholsHall_Nose001")&& 
(Role == "Modifier" || Role == "Reader")) -> "allow"; 
Signature: 
            "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:KISi0RAbUlYw1z+dr6oOd8hMagAP\ 
            1nQ2IBgVMNJDenZ1H…” 
Figure 6.13:  A test case where the user has “Reader” and “Modifier” role on the 
nose. 
 
The methods “powerOn” and “powerOff” which turns the device ON and OFF, 
require the role “Modifier”. The method “getPowerState” in the Nose Service which 
tells the current power state of the device requires the role “Reader”. Hence this client 
had both “Reader” and “Modifier” role on the device. In the Nose Client, the client 
requested for the “Current Power State” and the current power state was provided in 
the result box. According to the current power state, the client switched the device 
ON/OFF and the result of the actions was shown in the result box. This client was not 
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authorized to perform any other method such as “execute” or “resetDevice” and 
hence the request for these actions was denied access. 
 
Test case 3: User has role “Modifier” on all chemical sensors: 
In this test case, the user was a Modifier for all chemical sensors.  
KeyNote-version: 2 
Authorizer: "x509-base64:MIIEBzC…” 
Licensees: “"x509-base64:MIIECjCCA3OgAw..” 
Conditions: ((APP_DOMAIN == "SensorNet") && (Time >= "1152287101810") 
&& (Time <= "1183823100000") && (ServiceClassHierarchy ~= 
"^.*ChemicalSensor.*$") && (Role == "Administrator" || Role == "Reader" || Role 
== "Modifier")) -> "allow"; 
Signature: 
            "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:KISi0RAbUlYw1z+dr6oOd8hMagAP\ 
            1nQ2IBgVMNJDenZ1H…” 
Figure 6.14:  A test case where the user has “Modifier” role on all the chemical 
sensors. 
 
Figure 6.14 shows the expressiveness in the credential. The credential is small and 
meaningful and uses the wild card characters to specify all the chemical sensors 
instead of listing the chemical sensors one by one. 
 
These test cases demonstrated the expressiveness and the simplicity in the credentials.  
The credentials can provide accesses to a client from a broader level to a very narrow 
or precise control on the capabilities of the devices. The attribute “Role” helps to 
avoid listing all the methods that a client wishes to perform making the simple, small 
and easy to understand.  
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6.4 Cross-Domain Communication  
The previous section demonstrated the extensions to the ACE set of action attributes 
to form the core attributes to achieve the granularity required for multi-owner 
architecture. Chapter 5 discussed the additional challenges arise when more than one 
organization is involved with regards to authentication of identity and authorization 
of actions. Section 5.3 proposed a solution of using a TTP (for authentication) and 
Broker (for authorization). This section details the prototype and the experiments 
conducted to verify the prototype. 
In order to demonstrate the cross-domain authentication, the following tasks were 
taken: 
1. A new “TTP” was created. The TTP keys were generated and self-signed 
certificate of the TTP was created using OPENSSL.  
2. Three Organizations A, B and C were chosen for the experiment. The CAs of 
Organization A and B have a trust relation with the TTP. Hence, the public 
keys of CA-Org-A and CA-Org-B are certified by the TTP. The TTP must 
indicate that these two CAs are not just end users, but authorities to certify 
other users in their organization. The TTP includes the X.509 extensions 
indicating this requirement, which is given below: 
basicConstraints=CA:TRUE,pathlen:1 
The pathlen parameter indicates the maximum number of CAs that can appear 
below the TTP in a chain. If there is a CA with a pathlen of zero, it can only 
be used to sign end user certificates and not further CAs. In this case, there are 
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no sub-domains within the organizations, and hence the pathlen is 1. But the 
number can be modified to include sub-domains within the main 
organizations. Java Keytool is used to manage a keystore (database) of the 
certificates. The certificates are protected using the keystore_password  [31]. 
The certificate chain for CA-Org-A is shown in the figure 6.15: 
CA-OrgA $ /tools/java/i586/jdk1.5.0_09/bin/keytool -v -list -keystore 
keystore 
Enter keystore password:   
 
Keystore type: jks 
Keystore provider: SUN 
Your keystore contains 2 entries 
 
Alias name: ca-orga-cert 
Creation date: Oct 30, 2007 
Entry type: keyEntry 
Certificate chain length: 2 
Certificate[1]: 
Owner: EMAILADDRESS=ca-org-A@ittc.ku.edu, CN=ca-org-A, OU=ITTC, 
O=KU, L=Lawrence, ST=KS, C=US 
Issuer: EMAILADDRESS=dummyttp@central.com, CN=dummyTTP, 
OU=TTP, O=Central, L=Dallas, ST=Texas, C=US 
Serial number: 1 
Valid from: Sun Oct 28 19:40:25 CDT 2007 until: Mon Oct 27 19:40:25 2008 
Certificate fingerprints: 
         MD5:  8A:AF:22:BE:A2:8C:3C:F3:DD:18:D1:7B:86:9A:86:58 
         SHA1: 17:82:CE:4E:FC:00:B7:8D:F3:49:19:B1:FD:B7:A3:CB.. 
Certificate[2]: 
Owner: EMAILADDRESS=dummyttp@central.com, CN=dummyTTP, 
OU=TTP, O=Central, L=Dallas, ST=Texas, C=US 
Issuer: EMAILADDRESS=dummyttp@central.com, CN=dummyTTP, 
OU=TTP, O=Central, L=Dallas, ST=Texas, C=US 
Serial number: 0 
Valid from: Sun Oct 28 19:27:35 CDT 2007 until: Mon Oct 27 19:27:35 2008 
Certificate fingerprints: 
  MD5:  6B:D3:10:48:9D:A1:6D:F4:3F:D3:A5:D7:DD:69:EC:AF 
 SHA1: 00:F4:B6:0E:3C:19:EB:8C:8A:B3:48:8E:CC:7A:2E:E6:79:3A:95:CB 
 
            Figure 6.15: Certificate chain of CA-Org-A. 
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The figure 6.15 shows that there are 2 certificates in this chain: 
a. The public key certificate of CA-Org-A issued by the TTP, and 
b. The self-signed certificate of the TTP. 
CA of Organization C was created. This organization does not have a trust 
relationship with the TTP. Hence, the CA-Org-C has a self-signed certificate. 
3. User “Alice”, “Bob” and “Carol” of Organization A, B and C were created. 
Their public keys are certified by the CA of the respective organization. The 
certificate was indicated that these users are end-users and not CAs, by 
providing a “False” to the X.509 extensions: 
basicConstraints=CA:FALSE 
The certificate chain of Bob is shown in the following figure 6.16: 
[bob_orgB@terbium .ace_test]$ /tools/java/i586/jdk1.5.0_09/bin/keytool  -v -
list -keystore keystore 
Enter keystore password:  i#J[^ji1s| 
 
Keystore type: jks 
Keystore provider: SUN 
 
Your keystore contains 3 entries 
 
Alias name: bob-cert 
Creation date: Oct 30, 2007 
Entry type: keyEntry 
Certificate chain length: 3 
Certificate[1]: 
Owner: EMAILADDRESS=bobbob@orgb.com, CN=bob, OU=ORGB, 
O=ORGB, L=Dallas, ST=Texas, C=US 
Issuer: EMAILADDRESS=caorgB@orgb.edu, CN=CAORGB, OU=CA-
ORGB, O=XXX, L=Dallas, ST=Texas, C=US 
Serial number: 1 
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Valid from: Tue Oct 30 21:33:32 CDT 2007 until: Wed Oct 29 21:33:32 CDT 
2008 
Certificate fingerprints: 
         MD5:  44:7E:7E:7C:04:E9:8C:01:B8:4B:86:79:02:29:8D:72 
         SHA1: 
C4:B6:E4:7D:D9:11:B9:3B:89:49:98:20:8A:6F:90:72:A2:91:0E:BF 
Certificate[2]: 
Owner: EMAILADDRESS=caorgB@orgb.edu, CN=CAORGB, OU=CA-
PRGB, O=XXX, L=Dallas, ST=Texas, C=US 
Issuer: EMAILADDRESS=dummyttp@central.com, CN=dummyTTP, 
OU=TTP, O=Central, L=Dallas, ST=Texas, C=US 
Serial number: 2 
Valid from: Tue Oct 30 20:36:16 CDT 2007 until: Wed Oct 29 20:36:16 CDT 
2008 
Certificate fingerprints: 
         MD5:  BB:3B:99:E4:24:86:81:FC:30:53:BF:9A:9A:A9:3E:1B 
         SHA1: 
52:01:B2:44:CE:B4:69:EB:B7:9A:8E:6E:42:ED:AA:81:6B:C9:A1:90 
Certificate[3]: 
Owner: EMAILADDRESS=dummyttp@central.com, CN=dummyTTP, 
OU=TTP, O=Central, L=Dallas, ST=Texas, C=US 
Issuer: EMAILADDRESS=dummyttp@central.com, CN=dummyTTP, 
OU=TTP, O=Central, L=Dallas, ST=Texas, C=US 
Serial number: 0 
Valid from: Sun Oct 28 19:27:35 CDT 2007 until: Mon Oct 27 19:27:35 CDT 
2008 
Certificate fingerprints: 
         MD5:  6B:D3:10:48:9D:A1:6D:F4:3F:D3:A5:D7:DD:69:EC:AF 
         SHA1: 
00:F4:B6:0E:3C:19:EB:8C:8A:B3:48:8E:CC:7A:2E:E6:79:3A:95:CB 
           Figure 6.16: Certificate chain of Bob of Organization B. 
 
4. A Broker was created. Organizations A and B have trust relationship with the 
Broker by providing a credential. Organization A decides to provide the 
“Reader” privileges from Profile Database Service to users of other 
organization. Organization A issues a credential to the Broker to delegate 
“Reader” privileges on this service to users of other organizations.  
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5. Bob from Organization B requests the Broker to issue a credential to talk to 
Profile Database service of Organization A. The Broker issues the following 
credential: 
            KeyNote-version: 2 
Authorizer: Broker "x509-base64:MIIEBzC…” 
Licensees: Bob-Org-B “"x509-base64:MIIECjCCA3OgAw..” 
Conditions:  
((APP_DOMAIN == "SensorNet") && (Provider == "OrganizationA") &&    
(ServiceID == "NicholsHall_ServiceDir") &&  
(Role == "Reader")) -> "allow";   #ServiceDir 
((APP_DOMAIN == "SensorNet") && (Provider == "OrganizationA")     
&&    
(ServiceID == "NicholsHall_RoomDatabase") &&  
(Method == "getRoom" )) -> "allow";    #RegionalDB  
((APP_DOMAIN == "SensorNet") && (Provider == "OrganizationA") &&   
 (ServiceID == "NicholsHall_ProfileDatabase001") &&  
 (Role == "Reader")) -> "allow";   #SensorNetDBService 
Signature:  "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:KISi0RAbUlYw1z+dr6oOd8hMagAP” 
Figure 6.17: A credential issued from Broker to Bob-Org B to access Profile 
Database Service of Organization A. 
 
6.4.1   System Configuration  
The following configuration was setup to demonstrate the cross-domain 
communication: 
 
1) Profile Database Service was started by the CA-Org-A in one computer 
(khan.ittc.ku.edu - Pentium III 750 MHz processor, 256 MB RAM, 10 GB 
HDD, Red Hat Enterprise Linux WS release 4).  The service connects to the 
smell Profile Database. The service was given the ServiceID 
"NicholsHall_ProfileDatabase001” by providing an external action attribute 
file. This service is informed of the trust relationship with the Broker. 
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2) Organization A has a Nose Service which is internal to the Organization. The 
Nose Service was started on one computer (terbium.ittc.ku.edu - Intel(R) 
Xeon(TM) CPU 2.66GHz, 1 GB RAM, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5). 
3) The Profile Database client was executed by user “Bob” on one computer 
(sentry.ittc.ku.edu - Intel(R) Xeon(TM) CPU 2.80GHz, 1 GB RAM, Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux –SMP). 
6.4.2   Testing and Results 
The following test cases were performed to demonstrate the cross-domain 
communication.  
Test Case 1: A user can authenticate and also authorize to a service from 
different organization: 
Bob from Organization B contacts the Profile Database service. The service 
authenticates Bob as there is a common signer or trust between the CAs of both the 
organizations. Bob provides the credential issued by the Broker. The service informs 
the KeyNote engine the Policy authorizing the CA-Org-A, the credential issued to the 
Broker authorizing to delegate access to Profile Database and the credential issued by 
the Broker to access Profile Database. The KeyNote determines that the user “Bob” 
has “Reader” privileges on the Profile Database service. Hence, the service authorizes 
Bob to view the smell profiles in the database. The figure 6.18 given below illustrates 
this test case. 
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Figure 6.18: Illustration of a Cross –Domain communication showing two cases: 
where a user from Org-B: can 1) authenticate and authorize to Profile DB Service and 
2) authenticate but not authorize to Nose Service of Organization-A.  
 
 
Test Case 2: A user can authenticate but can not authorize to a service from 
different organization: 
User Bob requests the Broker to issue a credential to contact the Nose service of 
Organization A. But the Nose service is internal to the organization and the Broker 
does not have the authority to issue credential for Nose service. Consider a case 
where the Broker issues a wrong credential to Bob, authorizing the access to Nose 
service. Bob uses this credential to contact the Nose. The Nose service authenticates 
Bob, as there is a common signer or trust between the CAs of both the organizations, 
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but denies access to perform any operation on the Nose device due to the invalid 
credential issued by the Broker. The figure 6.18 illustrates this test case. This test case 
demonstrates that organization has control on deciding what services are internal and 
external to the organization, and even if the Broker issues a wrong credential, the 
service will deny access. The Broker should have knowledge of the services that are 
external to the organization to avoid issuing wrong credentials. 
 
Test Case 3: A user can not authenticate and authorize to a service from 
different organization: 
Carol from Organization C contacts the Profile Database service. The Profile 
Database service and Carol are not able to authenticate each other, as there is no 
common signer or trust between the CA of both the organizations. Hence, Carol is 
reported the failure in the handshake procedure as there is no trust in the certificate 
chain. The figure 6.19 illustrates this test case. 
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Figure 6.19: Illustration of a Cross –Domain communication where a user from 
Organization C cannot authenticate and hence not authorize to Profile DB Service of 
Organization A. 
  
Thus, cross-domain communication is achieved. These test cases demonstrated the 
establishment of trusts between organizations through the TTP and Broker. The test 
cases also demonstrated that though there is a central authority to issue public key 
certificates, the control on what services to delegate and what actions that can be 
performed on them still remains within the organization thus providing the access-
control required for multi-owner architecture. 
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7  Conclusion and Future Work 
A unified architecture that control access to sensors by integrating very 
components has been proposed and studied. The developed access control framework 
provides for a flexible security and policy model to support the multi-owner 
architecture. This framework has been successfully designed and tested using a 
prototype implementation. Several manually implemented components of the 
prototype such as the offline interaction between the CA and the user for issuing 
credentials and the interaction between the CA and the Service Author for 
determining the available methods and the corresponding role mappings can be 
automated. The set of action attributes could be extended to include deployment 
specific attributes such as the physical location of the device, the connection of the 
device to the service etc. The architecture could be extended to support mobile 
sensors. Performing actions on sensors using serialized java objects can be re-
implemented using a method like XML-RPC [33] to make the system accessible to all 
programming languages and across all operating systems. Experiments to measure 
performance, scalability and deployment issues to complement prototype 
demonstrations could be designed.  
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A.  Appendix  
A.1 Nose Client with MVC Paradigm 
To improve the Nose client program that is used to talk to the Nose Service, Model 
View Controller (MVC) paradigm was used. MVC is a design paradigm used by 
applications to need the ability to separate display from the data. The MVC pattern 
hinges on a clean separation of objects into one of three categories: model for 
maintaining data, views for displaying all or a portion of the data, and controllers for 
handling events that affect the model or view(s). It provides a clear distinction 
between the module containing the data, the model to display and the model to 
manage the user interactions.  
The classes implemented for MVC includes: 
1. BaseClientModel - contains the basic functions that any client has to perform 
in order to get the handle to the remote service using RMI. 
2. NoseClientModel – handles the data in the nose client 
3. NoseClientView – handles the display of the GUI components 
4. NoseClientController – handles the user interactions with the GUI 
5. NoseClient – creates the model, view and the controller. 
The interaction in the MVC classes of nose client can be of two types: 
1. Controller providing the results to the View to update its display 
2. Model providing the results to the View to update its display 
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A.1.1 Controller providing the results for the View to update its 
Display 
 
Figure A.1 shows the interaction between the three classes when a “Start 
Identification” button is clicked by the user.  
 
Figure A.1: MVC Communication cycle when “Start Identification” is clicked. 
 
The sequence of operations includes: 
• The User clicks the button “Start Identification”  
• Controller receives this event, asks the model to perform a new identification. 
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• The model talks to the nose service, and asks it to start a new identification and 
gets the result of the action from the nose service. 
• The model returns the result to the controller. 
• The controller returns the results to the view to update in the result box. 
 
A.1.2 Model providing the results for the View to update its Display 
 
Figure A.2 shows the sequence of operations when a “Show the list of Profiles” 
button is clicked. 
 
Figure A.2: MVC Communication cycle when “Show list of profiles” is clicked 
  91
The sequence of operations includes: 
1. The User clicks the button “Show the list of Profiles”  
2. Controller receives this event, asks the model to get the list of profiles. 
3. The model does the required work to fetch the list of profiles. 
4. As the model’s data is changed, the model informs its “Observer” (the 
NoseClientView) with the new list of profiles. The view updates its combo 
box with the list of profiles notified by the model. 
